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Abstract—This paper studies secrecy rate optimization in a
wireless network with a single-antenna source, a multi-antenna
destination and a multi-antenna eavesdropper. This is an un-
favorable scenario for secrecy performance as the system is
interference-limited. In the literature, assuming that the receiver
operates in half duplex (HD) mode, the aforementioned problem
has been addressed via use of cooperating nodes who act as
jammers to confound the eavesdropper. This paper investigates
an alternative solution, which assumes the availability of a full
duplex (FD) receiver. In particular, while receiving data, the
receiver transmits jamming noise to degrade the eavesdropper
channel. The proposed self-protection scheme eliminates the need
for external helpers and provides system robustness. For the case
in which global channel state information is available, we aim to
design the optimal jamming covariance matrix that maximizes
the secrecy rate and mitigates loop interference associated with
the FD operation. We consider both fixed and optimal linear
receiver design at the destination, and show that the optimal
jamming covariance matrix is rank-1, and can be found via
an efficient 1-D search. For the case in which only statistical
information on the eavesdropper channel is available, the optimal
power allocation is studied in terms of ergodic and outage secrecy
rates. Simulation results verify the analysis and demonstrate
substantial performance gain over conventional HD operation
at the destination.
Keywords
Full-duplex, physical-layer security, jamming, beamforming,
MIMO, convex optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication technology has been integrated in
almost all the aspects of social life. Cellular mobile networks,
sensor/body networks, smart grid, smart home and smart cities
are just some examples of wireless systems that people are
using or will use in the near future. Under this uncontrolled
growth of wireless personal information transfer, confiden-
tiality and secret transmission is introduced as an emergent
research topic. Traditionally, security is addressed at the upper
layers of the protocol stack by using cryptographic tools,
which basically rely on the computational limitations of the
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eavesdroppers. Given that these approaches are sensitive to
the wireless transmission and management of the secret keys,
recently there has been growing interest to ensure secrecy and
confidentiality at the physical (PHY) layer. PHY layer security
is an information-theoretic approach and achieves secrecy by
using channel codes and signal processing techniques. The
seminal work of Wyner [1] introduced the degraded wiretap
channel and the fundamental notion of secrecy capacity. Since
then, several studies have been proposed in the literature from
the viewpoints of both information theory [2]–[5] and signal
processing [6]–[15].
An efficient way to increase the secrecy rate in wireless
systems is to degrade the decoding capability of the eavesdrop-
pers by introducing controlled interference, or artificial noise
(AN). When the transmitter has multiple antennas, this can be
achieved by having the transmitter embed in its transmission
artificial noise, [6][7][8], which can be designed to avoid
the legitimate receiver and only affect the eavesdroppers
[6][7]. Under imperfect eavesdroppers channel state informa-
tion (CSI), an AN-aided outage secrecy-rate maximization
problem was tackled in [8].
When the transmitter is restricted to the use of one antenna,
a bank of external relays can be employed to collaboratively
send jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper channel.
This approach is referred to as cooperative jamming (CJ) [9]–
[15]. The optimal CJ relay weights design for maximizing
the secrecy rate is investigated in [9][10]. An opportunistic
selection of two relays, where one relay re-forwards the
transmitted signal, while the other uses the CJ strategy is
discussed in [11] in the context of a multi-relay network.
In [12], the authors study the secrecy outage probability
using CJ for different levels of CSI. The optimal transmit
beamforming together with AN design for minimizing the
secrecy outage probability is addressed in [13][14]. The work
in [15] combines CJ with interference alignment. The idea of
using destination and source as jammers in the first phase of
a two-phase relay network, is proposed in [16]. A destination-
assisted jamming scheme is used in [17] to prevent the system
becoming interference-limited.
Based on the existing literature, CJ approaches are mainly
rely on external helpers, thus suffer from issues related to
helper mobility, synchronization and trustworthiness. More
recently, some approaches have been proposed that do not
require external helpers for jamming, such as the iJam scheme
of [18], in which the receiver acts as a jammer. In the iJam
scheme, the source repeats the transmission, while the receiver
randomly jams one of the transmitted copies in each sample
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time; since the eavesdropper does not know which sample
is “clean”, it cannot decode the transmitted signal. However,
this self-protection procedure requires a retransmission of the
source signal which lowers throughput. In the majority of the
literature, the terminals operate in half-duplex (HD) mode,
thus are not able to receive and transmit data simultaneously.
However, recent advances on electronics, antenna technology
and signal processing allow the implementation of full duplex
(FD) terminals that can receive and transmit data in the same
time and on the same frequency band. When it comes to relay-
ing, the FD operation can utilize the channel more effectively
by achieving end-to-end transmission in one channel use, as
long as the loop interference (LI) that leaks from the relay
output to the relay input can be addressed [19], [20]. Antenna
isolation, time cancelation and spatial precoding have been
proposed in the literature for the mitigation of LI [21], [22],
[23], [24]. Comparison of the HD and the FD systems with
transmit power adaptation is given in [25].
In the context of PHY layer secrecy, the potential benefits
of the FD relaying technology have not yet fully explored.
In [26] the authors employ FD technology in a PHY layer
secrecy context but from the adversary point of view; the paper
investigates an FD eavesdropper with LI that optimizes its
beamforming weights in order to minimize the secrecy rate of
the system. An FD receiver generating AN is proposed in [27]
to impair the eavesdropper’s channel. The secrecy performance
of that method is evaluated based on the outage secrecy region
from a geometrical perspective. However, in [27] it is assumed
that the LI can be perfectly canceled at the receiver, which
might be too optimistic. To the best of our knowledge, the use
of FD with spatial LI mitigation in order to enlarge the secrecy
rate of the system has not been reported in the literature.
Inspired by the works in [17], [18], [26] and [27], in this
paper we study the potential benefits of an FD destination node
simultaneously acting as a jammer and a receiver, with the goal
of improving the secrecy rate. We consider an unfavorable
situation of a single-antenna source, thus source generated
will not improve the secrecy rate a [6][27] as there are not
enough degrees of freedom to design the jamming signal. The
proposed approach provides a self-protection mechanism at
the receiver side without requiring external assistance, out-of-
band channel or data retransmission, and is mainly of interest
in applications in which assisting nodes are not available
and/or are not trusted. Remarkably, for the case in which
the destination has multiple transmit or receive antennas, we
show that the system is no longer interference-limited and the
secrecy rate does not suffer from saturation at high signal-to-
noise-ratio (SNR) as in the HD case. In order to tackle the
problem of LI and maximize the secrecy rate, joint transmit
and receive beamforming design is studied at the destination.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• In contrast to previous works employing FD nodes [27],
we do not assume complete self-interference cancelation,
but we rather employ a LI model whose parameter
describes the effect of the passive self-interference sup-
pression.
• For the scenario of a destination with one transmit and
one receive antenna, and a single antenna eavesdropper,
we derive the closed form solution for the power alloca-
tion at the receiver. It is shown that due to the LI, the
destination usually does not use all the available power.
• When the destination has multiple transmit antennas, the
system is no longer interference-limited. We show that in
that case the optimal jamming covariance matrix is rank-
1; and propose efficient algorithms to find the optimal
covariance matrix. Both fixed and optimal linear receivers
are considered.
• When only eavesdropper CDI is available, we optimize
the power allocation with respect to ergodic secrecy rate
and outage secrecy rate.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section II,
we present the general system model and introduce the FD
receiver and the self-jamming operation. Section III narrows
down to a single-antenna case and derives the optimal power
allocation for the destination and the source. Section IV deals
with optimal jamming covariance design. In Section V, we
address the jamming design and power allocation to maximize
the ergodic secrecy rate and the outage secrecy rate. In Section
VI, we study the optimal jamming covariance design when the
eavesdropper knows the FD operation of the destination and
also adopts the optimal linear receiver. Simulation results are
presented in Section VII and Section VIII concludes this paper.
A. Notation
Throughout this paper, the following notation will be
adopted. Vectors and matrices are represented by boldface
lowercase and uppercase letters, respectively. ‖ · ‖ denotes the
Frobenius norm. (·)† denotes the Hermitian operation of a
vector or matrix. E[·] denotes the expectation of a random
variable. The notation A ∈ CM×N indicates that A is
complex matrix with dimensions M × N . A  0 means
that A is positive semi-definite. I denotes an identity matrix
of appropriate dimension. Finally, x ∼ CN (m,Θ) denotes a
vector x of complex Gaussian elements with a mean vector
of m and a covariance matrix of Θ.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a wireless communication system with one source
S with a single antenna, one destination D and one passive
eavesdropper E, with M and Me antennas, respectively, as
depicted in Fig. 1. D’s total M antennas are divided to Mr
receive antennas and Mt transmit antennas with M = Mt +
Mr.
Let hsd ∈ CMr×1, hse ∈ CMe×1 and Hed ∈ CMe×Mt
denote the S−D, S−E and between D−E channels, respectively.
nD ∼ CN (0, I) and nE ∼ CN (0, I) represent noise at D
and E, respectively. The transmit signal s is assumed to be
a zero-mean complex Gaussian random variable with power
constraint E[|s|2] ≤ Ps.
In the considered network configuration, there is no external
relay or helper to assist D against E. Instead, as shown in Fig.
1, D helps itself by operating in FD mode and transmitting
jamming signals to degrade the quality of the eavesdropper’s
link to S. The receiver transmits a jamming signal while
it simultaneously receives the source signal. This creates a
3feedback loop channel from the relay output to the relay input
through the effective channel Hsi =
√
ρH ∈ CMr×Mt , where
H is a fading loop channel [19], [20], [21], [22]. In order to
make our study more general, we parameterize the LI channel
by introducing the variable ρ with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 [26]; this
parameter models the effect of passive LI suppression such
as antenna isolation [21]. Therefore, ρ = 0 refers to the ideal
case of no LI (perfect antenna isolation) while 0 < ρ ≤ 1
corresponds to different LI levels.
We assume that D transmits the jamming signal n ∼
CN (0,Q). The covariance matrix Q will be designed to
a maximize the secrecy rate with power constraint pd =
trace(Q) ≤ Pd. We assume that E is not aware of the FD
operation of D, and simply uses a maximum ratio combining
(MRC) receiver, h†se1. The received signal at E is yE =
hses + Hedn + ne. After applying MRC receiver, the data
estimate at E is:
sˆe =
h†se
‖hse‖ (hses+Hedn+ ne). (1)
D employs a linear receiver, r, on its received signal, yD =
hsds+
√
ρHn+ nd, to obtain the data estimate
sˆd = r
†(hsds+
√
ρHn+ nd), with ‖r‖ = 1. (2)
The achievable secrecy rate is expressed as [12]
RS = max
{
0, log2
(
1 +
Ps|r†hsd|2
1 + ρr†HQH†r
)
− log2

1 + Ps‖hse‖2
1 +
h
†
seHedQH
†
ed
hse
‖hse‖2



 . (3)
We should note that the above secrecy rate also corresponds
to the case of an external jammer helper with Mt antennas,
whose channels to D and E are ρH and Hed, respectively. The
difference in the considered case is that D needs to perform
LI cancelation to achieve that rate. In this paper, we consider
LI mitigation in the spatial domain, in order to keep the
complexity low. For FD systems with multiple antennas, the
suppression of LI in the spatial domain has been addressed in
the literature i.e., [21], [24], where the low rank of the spatial
LI channel is exploited to avoid the transmit signal noise,
which is the main source of the residual LI. Alternatively,
the LI can be mitigated in the time domain using analogue
or/and digital LI cancelation. However, this approach requires
expensive cancelation circuits and is sensitive to transmit noise
due to non-idealities at the relay node [22]. It is worth noting
that the time cancelation requires two rounds of pilots for the
case of successive analogue/digital cancelation, which further
increases the complexity of the suppression process [23].
Throughout this paper, we assume that positive secrecy rate
is achievable. In the following, we will study the transmit
beamforming optimization at D to maximize the secrecy rate
RS , with the power constraint Pd at D, or the joint S − D
power constraint PT . We will begin with perfect CSI, and
later consider the case in which the CSI of E is not known.
1 Once E knows the FD mode of D, it may adapt its strategy as well, e.g., it
can use the linear minimum mean square error (MMSE) receiver to mitigate
the jamming from D. This will be analyzed in Section VI.
III. PERFECT CSI WITH SINGLE-ANTENNA TERMINALS
In this section, we assume that global CSI is available,
E has a single receive antenna and D has one transmit and
one receive antenna. In this case, the LI cannot be mitigated
in the spatial domain but is controlled by the power control
process. Although substantial isolation between the transmitter
and receiver channels has been recently reported [28], the
single-antenna case is mainly used as a baseline scheme for
comparison reasons and as a guideline for the multiple-antenna
case. The main focus of the work is the multiple-antenna case
which allows LI mitigation in the spatial domain.
Following the conventional notation, we use lower-case
letters to denote scalar channels. Because the jamming signal
from D degrades the performance of both E and D via the LI
channel, the destination needs to carefully choose the transmit
power pd to achieve a good balance. Using (3), the secrecy
rate maximization via power control at D can be formulated
as
max
0≤pd≤Pd
fρ(pd) ,
1 + Ps|hsd|
2
1+ρpd|h|2
1 + Ps|hse|
2
1+pd|hed|2
. (4)
One may observe that (4) looks as if there was an external
helper who transmits jamming signals to improve the secrecy
rate.
Before we derive its solution, we first study the conditions
under which when positive secrecy rate is possible.
Lemma 1: The conditions under which the positive secrecy
is achieved are
• ρ < min( |hed|
2
|h|2 ,
|hsd|
2(1+Pd|hed|
2)
Pd|h|2|hse|2
− 1
Pd|h|2
); or
• ρ ≥ |hed|2|h|2 and |hsd|2 > |hse|2.
Proof: The positive secrecy is achieved if and only if the
optimal objective value of the following problem is strictly
greater than 1:
max
0≤pd≤Pd
|hsd|2
1 + ρpd|h|2
1 + pd|hed|2
|hse|2 . (5)
It is not difficult to see that the optimal value is achieved at
either p∗d = 0 or p∗d = Pd.
• When ρ < |hed|
2
|h|2 , p
∗
d = Pd. Positive secrecy rate is
achieved if and only if
|hsd|2
1 + ρPd|h|2 >
|hse|2
1 + Pd|hed|2 , or (6)
ρ <
|hsd|2(1 + Pd|hed|2)
Pd|h|2|hse|2 −
1
Pd|h|2 . (7)
• When ρ ≥ |hed|2|h|2 , p∗d = 0. Positive secrecy rate is
achieved if and only if
|hsd|2 > |hse|2. (8)
This completes the proof.
It is clearly seen that when the LI can be sufficiently sup-
pressed, the positive secrecy region can be extended by the FD
destination; when the LI is above a certain threshold, FD does
not provide any performance gain therefore is not necessary.
Given that a positive secrecy rate is achievable, the optimal
solution to (4) is given in the Proposition 1 and the proof is
provided in Appendix A.
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Proposition 1: Suppose the roots of f ′ρ(pd) = 0 are
x1(ρ), x2(ρ). If they are both real, we assume x2(ρ) ≥ x1(ρ).
If both are complex or non-positive, we define x2(ρ) = 0. Let
δ = |hsd|
2|hed|
2
|hse|2|h|2
. Then the optimal p∗d(ρ) to maximize fρ(pd)
is given below:
i) If ρ < min(δ, 1), p∗d(ρ) = min(Pd, x2(ρ));
ii) If 1 ≥ ρ ≥ min(δ, 1), p∗d(ρ) = 0 or p∗d(ρ) = Pd,
whichever gives a higher objective value.
As a special case, when the S− D and S− E channels have
the same strength or S− E and S− D have the same distances,
we have the following result.
Corollary 1: pd(ρ) is a monotonically non-increasing func-
tion when |hsd|2 = |hse|2.
Proof: When |hsd|2 = |hse|2, the equation (51) reduces
to (b− d)x2 − (1/d− 1/b)(1 + a) = 0 and we have the root
x2(ρ) =
√
1+a
bd
=
√
1+Ps
ρ|h|2|hed|2
, where a, b, c, d are defined in
Appendix A.
i) When ρ < |hed|2|h|2 , f
′
ρ(pd) > 0 for 0 ≤ pd ≤ x2(ρ), so
p∗d(x) = min(Pd, x2(ρ));
ii) When ρ ≥ |hed|2|h|2 , f
′
ρ(pd) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ pd ≤ x2(ρ),
so p∗d(x) = 0. In this case, positive secrecy rate is not
achievable.
Clearly x2(ρ) is a monotonically decreasing function and this
completes the proof.
Typical curves of pd are shown in Fig. 2, where we plot
the normalized pd(ρ) for two sets of randomly generated
channel parameters. For each subfigure, we also plot the results
by setting |hsd|2 = |hse|2 = 1, while keeping the other
parameters fixed. We can see that in general the receiver
may not always use full power and pd(ρ) is not necessarily
monotonically changing with ρ.
This can be explained by the fact that when ρ is small,
the self-interference is also small, so the receiver can use full
or high power to confuse the eavesdropper; as ρ increases,
the receiver needs to reduce its transmit power in order not
to generate too much self-interference; when ρ is very close
to 1, the receiver causes high interference to both itself and
the eavesdropper, but if the eavesdropper suffers more, the
receiver can still increase its transmit power, otherwise, it
should decrease its power. The results in Fig. 2 verify our
analysis given in Corollary 1.
Next we consider the case where S and D have a total
power constraint PT and we denote their power as ps and
pd, respectively. We aim to maximize the secrecy rate below
fρ(ps, pd) ,
1 + ps|hsd|
2
1+ρpd|h|2
1 + ps|hse|
2
1+pd|hed|2
by using optimal power allocation between S and D.
Proposition 2: If the source and the receiver has a total
power constraint PT and strictly positive secrecy rate is
achievable, then full power should be used, i.e., ps+pd = PT .
Proof: Strictly positive secrecy rate implies that there
exists a solution (ps, pd) such that
ps|hsd|2
1 + ρpd|h|2 >
ps|hse|2
1 + pd|hed|2 ,
and this means f(ps, pd) is increasing in ps. So if there is
any unused power ∆p, we can always add it to ps to obtain
f(ps +∆p, pd) > f(ps, pd).
Consequently, the power allocation problem can be formulated
as
max
0≤α≤1
1 + αPT |hsd|
2
1+ρ(1−α)PT |h|2
1 + αPT |hse|
2
1+(1−α)PT |hed|2
,
where we have assumed that ps = αPT and Pd = (1− α)PT
with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
For simplicity, we assume that |hsd|2 = |hse|2 = 1, i.e., the
channels to D and E have the same normalized strength, then
we have the following solution:
α∗ =


0, if ρ ≥ |hed|2|h|2 ;
1
1+
√
PT+1
(PT |hed|
2+1)(PT |h|
2ρ+1)
, if 0 ≤ ρ < |hed|2|h|2 .
(9)
It can be seen that when 0 ≤ ρ < |hed|2|h|2 , i.e., positive
secrecy rate is possible, the source power ps is monotonically
increasing in ρ. This is because the larger ρ is, the less
the receiver power pd is, and the conclusion follows due to
constant sum power of S and D.
We have shown that for the single-antenna case, D may not
use full transmit power Pd. To conclude this section, we study
the performance at high signal-to-noise (SNR). Suppose ps
pd
=
β remains constant, then
lim
pd→∞
RS = max
(
0, log
(
1 +
β|hsd|2
ρ|h|2
)
− log
(
1 +
β|hse|2
|hed|2
))
,
(10)
which indicates the secrecy rate will saturate when pd →∞.
This is because the self-interference cannot be fully canceled
[22] and becomes a limiting factor at high SNR.
IV. MULTIPLE-ANTENNA RECEIVER
In this section, we study the transmitter design when both
the destination and the eavesdropper has multiple antennas.
Based on (3), we first formulate the secrecy rate maximization
problem with power constraint at D, i.w.,
max
Q,‖r‖=1
1 + Ps|r
†hsd|
2
1+ρr†HQH†r
1 + Ps‖hse‖
2
1+
h
†
seHedQH
†
ed
hse
‖hse‖2
(11)
s.t. Q  0, trace(Q) ≤ Pd.
Different from the single-antenna case, the secrecy rate can
keep increasing with transmit power, as stated in Lemma 2
below.
Lemma 2: Given Mt > 1 or Mr > 1, the system is not
interference-limited.
Proof: It suffices to show that there exists a scheme whose
achievable secrecy rate does not saturate. It is easily seen that
as long as D has either multiple transmit or receive antennas,
r and Q can be chosen according to the zero-forcing (ZF)
5criterion such that r†HQH†r = 0 but h†seHedQH
†
edhse > 0.
As a result, the secrecy rate becomes
RS,ZF = max
(
0, log
(
1 + Ps‖hsd‖2
)
− log

1 + Ps‖hse‖2
1 +
h
†
seHedQH
†
ed
hse
‖hse‖2



 . (12)
It is noted that the jamming signal sent by D does not affect
itself but degrades the received signal-to-noise plus interfer-
ence (SINR) at E. Therefore, RS,ZF is a strictly monotonically
increasing function of trace(Q). The system is no longer
interference-limited, and the secrecy rate RS,ZF can increase
with Pd without saturation. This completes the proof.
In the following, we assume that Mt > 1 and derive
the optimal solutions to problem (11). When Mt = 1, the
jamming covariance matrix design reduces to jamming power
optimization, and has been addressed in the previous section.
Before we address the optimal jamming covariance design,
we will present two useful lemmas about the properties of the
optimal Q∗.
Lemma 3: The optimal Q∗ to solve (11) should be rank-1.
Proof: Let Q∗, r∗ be any solution to the problem (11).
If Q∗ is rank one, the desired result is obtained. If Q∗ is
not rank-1, let r†HQ∗H†r = x, h†seHedQ∗H
†
edhse = y and
consider the following problem
min
Q
r†HQH†r, s.t. Tr(QH†edhseh
†
seHed) = y, Tr(Q) ≤ Pd.
(13)
Obviously, Q∗ is feasible for the above problem. We want
to prove that Q∗ is also the optimal solution to (13). Let Q′
be any solution to the above problem (13). Then it holds that
r†HQ′H†r = x. This is because if r†HQ′H†r < x, then
Q′ is feasible for the problem of (11) but achieves a strictly
larger objective value than Q∗ in (11). But this contradicts the
fact that Q∗ is the optimal solution to (11), so Q∗ is also the
optimal solution to (13).
Problem (13) is a homogeneous quadratically constrained
quadratic program (QCQP) with two constraints. According
to the results in [29], it has a rank-1 solution. Thus it follows
that the problem of (11) has a rank-1 solution Q∗.
The next lemma is about the power consumption of jamming
signals.
Lemma 4: Given that H†r does not align with H†edhse, i.e.,
there exists no scalar g such that H†r = gH†edhse, the optimal
Q∗ satisfies trace(Q∗) = Pd.
Proof: We prove it by contradiction. Suppose the optimal
solution is Q1 and trace(Q1) < Pd. We then choose x such
that h†seHedx = 0, r†Hx 6= 0 and trace(Q1) + ‖x‖2 = Pd.
This is possible due to the assumption that H†r does not align
with H†edhse. Construct a new solution Q2 = Q1 + xx†. It
is easy to verify that Q2 is a strictly better solution than Q1
with trace(Q2) = Pd, which contradicts the optimality of Q1.
This completes the proof.
In the special case in which the condition H†r = gH†edhse
holds, the equivalent channels for the two links D−D and D−E
align with each other. This is not desired and can normally be
avoided by D via proper design of r. Because this condition
is easy to detect, in the sequel we assume it does not hold.
By introducing Q = Pdqq† and ‖q‖ = 1, problem (11)
becomes
max
‖q‖=1,‖r‖=1
1 + Ps|r
†hsd|
2
1+ρPdr†Hqq†H†r
1 + Ps‖hse‖
2
1+
Pdh
†
seHedqq
†H
†
ed
hse
‖hse‖2
. (14)
Next we will study problem (14). We begin with a fixed
receiver and then move to the optimal linear receiver; the
analysis is also extended for the case of joint power allocation
at S and D.
A. Optimal Solution with a Fixed Receiver
Let us assume that the receiver r is fixed and independent
of Q. Possible choices include the MRC and the minimum
mean square error (MMSE) receivers.
The problem of (14) is complicated and difficult to solve it
directly. Instead, we solve the following problem by introduc-
ing an auxiliary variable t:
max
q
h†seHedqq
†H
†
edhse (15)
s.t. r†Hqq†H†r = t, ‖q‖ = 1.
By denoting its optimal objective value as g(t), the original
problem of (14) becomes
max
t≥0
f(t) ,
1 + Ps|r
†hsd|
2
1+ρt
1 + Ps‖hse‖
2
1+
Pdg(t)
‖hse‖2
. (16)
We develop the following intermediate results to efficiently
solve the problem of (15).
Lemma 5: Let c2 =
H
†
ed
hse
‖H†
ed
hse‖
, c1 =
H†r
‖H†r‖
and r = |c†1c2|.
Then g(t) = 1 − (r√1− t −√(1− r2)t)2 and is a concave
function in t.
Proof: With the defined notation, (15) becomes
max
q
q†c2c
†
2q,
s.t. q†c1c
†
1q = t, ‖q‖ = 1. (17)
The closed-form solution g(t) then follows from Lemma 2
in [30]. The concavity can be proven by confirming that the
second order derivative of g(t) is negative.
Note that a similar problem as (17) has been studied in [10,
(14)] where individual constraints on each element of q are
assumed, hence, a closed-form solution is not possible. The
closed-form solution in Lemma 5 speeds up the algorithm to
solve (16).
Given Lemma 5, we have the following theorem that can
be used to develop efficient algorithms to solve (16).
Theorem 1: f(t) is quasi-concave in t and its maximum
can be found via bisection search.
Proof: Given that g(t) is a concave function, the result
follows from Theorem 3 in [10].
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B. Optimal Solution with The Optimal Linear Receiver
In this section, we aim to jointly optimize q as well as the
receiver design at D. From (3), the optimal linear receiver to
maximize the received SINR at D is given by
r =
(
ρHQH† + I
)−1
hsd
‖ (ρHQH† + I)−1 hsd‖
. (18)
Then the achievable secrecy rate is expressed as
RS = max
(
0, log2
(
1 + Psh
†
sd
(
ρHQH† + I
)−1
hsd
)
− log2

1 + Ps‖hse‖2
1 +
h
†
seHedQH
†
ed
hse
‖hse‖2




= max
(
0, log2
(
1 + Ps‖hsd‖2 − ρPsPd|h
†
sdHq|2
1 + ρPdq†H†Hq
)
− log2

1 + Ps‖hse‖2
1 + Pd|h
†
seHedq|2
‖hse‖2



 , (19)
where we have used the rank-1 property of Q and the notation
Q = Pdqq
† and ‖q‖ = 1, together with matrix inversion
lemma.
The secrecy rate expression RS in (19) is still complicated.
To tackle it, we study the following problem with the param-
eter t:
max
q
|h†seHedq|2 (20)
s.t.
|h†sdHq|2
1 + ρPdq†H†Hq
= t, ‖q‖2 = 1,
which is a nonconvex quadratic optimization problem and
difficult to solve, instead, we first study a modified problem
below by introducing Q˜ = qq†:
max
Q˜
trace(h†seHedQ˜H
†
edhse) (21)
s.t. trace(Q˜(H†hsdh
†
sdH− tρPdH†H)) = t,
Q˜  0, trace(Q˜) = 1.
(21) is a semidefinite programming problem and the method to
solve (21) is provided in Appendix B. Note that in Appendix
B, we have shown that the optimal Q˜ should be rank-1, so
(20) and (21) are equivalent in the sense that given the optimal
solution Q˜∗ to (21), the optimal q∗ to solve (20) can be
extracted via Q˜∗ = q∗q∗† . Denote its optimal objective
value as h(t), the secrecy rate maximization problem can be
formulated as
max
t≥0
R(t) , log

1 + Ps‖hsd‖2 − ρPsPdt
1 + Ps‖hse‖
2
1+
Pdh(t)
‖hse‖2

 . (22)
Thus the maximum of R(t) can be found via a one-
dimensional search.
C. Joint S-D Power Allocation
1) Optimal Solution: If D and S can share a total power
PT , then the problem is revised to
max
Q0,ps≥0, ps+trace(Q)≤PT
RS , (23)
where we have used ps to denote the source power as a
variable. Since we have derived the solution when there is
only power constraint Pd on D with a parameter t, we can
perform a 2-D search over ps and t to find the optimal Q and
power allocation ps. This is because all power should be used
up at the optimum, i.e., ps + trace(Q) = PT .
For the fixed linear receiver, we can reduce 2-D search to
a 1-D search. To achieve that, we first define a new objective
function based on (16):
f(ps, t) ,
1 + ps|r
†hsd|
2
1+ρt
1 + ps‖hse‖
2
1+
(PT−ps)g(t)
‖hse‖2
. (24)
For fixed t, setting its derivative regarding ps to be zero leads
to the following quadratic equation
Ap2s +Bps + C = 0, (25)
where A , − g(t)‖hse‖2 (‖hse‖2 −
g(t)
‖hse‖2
), B , − g(t)‖hse‖2 (1 +
PT
g(t)
‖hse‖2
), C , (1 + PT
g(t)
‖hse‖2
)((1 + PT
g(t)
‖hse‖2
) −
(1+ρt)‖hse‖
2
|r†hsd|2
). The optimal p∗s should either be PT or one
root of the equation (25) and denote it as PS(t). Then the
total power constrained secrecy optimization problem (23) for
a fixed receiver becomes
max
t≥0
1 + PS(t)|r
†hsd|
2
1+ρt
1 + PS(t)‖hse‖
2
1+
(PT−PS(t))g(t)
‖hse‖2
. (26)
Its optimal solution can be obtained via 1-D optimization over
t only.
For the optimal linear receiver, it is not possible to apply this
procedure because h(t), obtained from (21), is also a complex
function of pd. Due to this non-separability, we have to use
2-D search to find the optimal power allocation.
2) ZF Solution: In this section, we study a simple closed-
form solution based on the ZF criterion. For conciseness,
we only consider the case of the optimal receiver. This
corresponds to t = 0 in the problem of (22).
In (19), we can see that h†sdHq is a self-interference
term that may limit the system performance, so we impose
an additional constraint that self-interference is zero, i.e.,
h
†
sdHq = 0. Using this condition together with the matrix
inversion lemma, we can derive that the optimal linear receiver
in (18) reduces to r = hsd‖hsd‖ , which is essentially the MRC
receiver. Therefore (19) is simplified to
RS = max
(
0, log
(
1 + ps‖hsd‖2
)−
log

1 + ps‖hse‖2
1 + pd|h
†
seHedq|2
‖hse‖2



 , ‖q‖ = 1. (27)
7To maximize (27), we first study a simple problem below:
max
q
‖h†seHedq‖2 (28)
s.t. h†sdHq = 0, ‖q‖2 = 1.
The optimal solution and the optimal objective value of (28)
are given by, respectively,
qZF =
Π⊥
H†hsd
H
†
edhse
‖Π⊥
H†hsd
H
†
edhse‖
and ‖Π⊥H†hsdH
†
edhse‖2, (29)
where Π⊥X , I−X(X†X)−1X† denotes orthogonal projection
onto the orthogonal complement of the column space of X and
has the property Π⊥XΠ⊥X = Π⊥X. The resulting secrecy rate is
then written as
RS = max
(
0, log
(
1 + ps‖hsd‖2
)
− log

1 + ps‖hse‖2
1 +
pd‖Π⊥
H†hsd
H
†
ed
hse‖2
‖hse‖2



 . (30)
The optimal power allocation with a total power constraint
ps + pd = PT can then be optimized similar to (24).
V. TRANSMISSION DESIGN WITH CDI
In the previous sections, we assumed that the eavesdropper
CSI is perfectly known. This information can be available
when E is also an active user in the network (unauthorized
user) but in general it is difficult to obtain. In this section, we
study the case in which both S and D have perfect CSI, hsd, but
only CDI on E. For simplicity, we assume that the elements
of hse and Hed are zero-mean independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables with variances
σ2s and σ2d, respectively.
A. Expected Secrecy Rate
With CDI only, we first aim to maximize the ergodic secrecy
rate [31], i.e.,
max
Q,ps,‖r‖=1
Ehse,Hed
(
log2
(
1 +
ps|r†hsd|2
1 + ρr†HQH†r
)
− log2

1 + ps‖hse‖2
1 +
h
†
seHedQH
†
ed
hse
‖hse‖2



 (31)
s.t. Q  0, ps ≥ 0, ps + trace(Q) ≤ PT .
Due to the lack of instantaneous knowledge about the channels
to E, we consider a suboptimal MRC receiver based only on lo-
cal information: r = hsd‖hsd‖ and Q is chosen as Q =
pdWW
†
Mt−1
,
where W is an orthogonal basis of the null space of H†r,
i.e., r†HW = 0,W ∈ CMt×(Mt−1),W†W = I(Mt−1). Then
(31) becomes
max
pd,ps
Ehse,Hed
(
log2
(
1 + ps‖hsd‖2
)
− log2

1 + ps‖hse‖2
1 + pd
h
†
seHedWW
†H
†
ed
hse
(Mt−1)‖hse‖2



(32)
s.t. ps ≥ 0, ps + pd ≤ PT .
The expectation is still difficult to evaluate, so we optimize
its approximation below by taking expectation operations on
each individual random terms:
max
pd,ps
log2
(
1 + ps‖hsd‖2
) (33)
− log2

1 + psEhse(‖hse‖2)
1 + pdEhse,Hed
[
h
†
seHedWW
†H
†
ed
hse
(Mt−1)‖hse‖2
]


s.t. ps ≥ 0, ps + pd ≤ PT .
Notice that this approximation provides neither an upper nor
a lower bound of the original problem (32). Its effect will be
evaluated in Fig. 6.
We find the following lemma is useful to solve (33).
Lemma 6: X = h
†
seHedWW
†H
†
ed
hse
‖hse‖2
is a central chi-square
random variable with 2(Mt − 1) degrees of freedom.
Proof:
Suppose a matrix decomposition hse‖hse‖ = Ud, where
U is a unitary matrix and d is a zero vector except its
first element being 1. Define eigenvalue decomposition of
W = UwDwU
†
w , where Uw is a unitary matrix and Dw
is a diagonal matrix with all diagonal entries being 1 except
one element being 0.
Then X = h
†
seHedWW
†H
†
ed
hse
‖hse‖2
=
d†U†HedUwDwU
†
wH
†
edUd. Statistically X is identical
to
d†HedDwHedd =
Mt−1∑
n=1
‖Hed(1, n)‖2, (34)
where Hed(1, n) denotes Hed’s (1, n)-th element. This com-
pletes the proof.
Using Lemma 6, E[X](Mt−1) = 1, so we have the following
formulation:
max
pd,ps
log2
(
1 + ps‖hsd‖2
)− log2
(
1 +
psMeσ
2
s
1 + pdσ2d
)
(35)
s.t. ps ≥ 0, ps + pd ≤ PT .
Its solution can be found using similar procedures to solve
(24).
B. Outage Secrecy Rate
Now we take a different design criterion regarding the
available CDI for a slow fading channel, and we aim to
maximize the ǫ-outage secrecy rate r defined by
Probhse,Hed
(
log2
(
1 + ps|r†hsd|2
)
− log2
(
1 +
ps‖hse‖2
1 + pdx
Mt−1
)
≤ r
)
= ǫ, (36)
where we have used the assumption Q = pdWW
†
Mt−1
and x is a
random variable defined in Lemma 6. The outage secrecy rate
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maximization problem can be formulated as
max
ps,pd
r (37)
s.t. Probhse,Hed

1 + ps‖hsd‖2
1 + ps‖hse‖
2
1+
pdx
Mt−1
≤ 2r

 ≤ ǫ,
ps ≥ 0, ps + pd ≤ PT .
We can use bisection method to find the optimal r. The
remaining problem is how to calculate the outage probability,
which is rewritten below:
Probhse,Hed

1 + ps‖hsd‖2
1 + ps‖hse‖
2
1+
pdx
Mt−1
≤ 2r

 (38)
= Probhse,Hed
(
1 + ps‖hsd‖2
2r
≤ 1 + ps‖hse‖
2
1 + pdx
Mt−1
)
= Probhse,Hed
(
ps‖hse‖2
1 + pdx
Mt−1
≥ 1 + ps‖hsd‖
2
2r
− 1 , α
)
= Probhse,Hed
(
ps
α
‖hse‖2 − pdx
Mt − 1 ≥ 1
)
= Probhse,Hed
(
γ , z†Dz ≥ 1
)
, and z ∼ CN (0, I),
where D , diag



psα , · · · , psα︸ ︷︷ ︸
Me
,−pd, · · · ,−pd︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mt−1



 . It can be
seen that γ is an indefinite quadratic form in complex normal
variables and the outage probability can be derived as [32]
Prob(γ ≥ 1) = e
− 1
a¯
a¯mb¯n(m− 1)!(n− 1)! (39)
×
m−1∑
i=0
m−i−1∑
k=0
(m− 1)!(n+ i− 1)!
i!(m− i− 1)!k!
(
a¯+ b¯
a¯b¯
)−(i+n)
a¯m−i−k,
where a¯ , ps
α
, b¯ , pd,m , Me, n , Mt − 1.
VI. DESIGN OF Q WITH THE OPTIMAL LINEAR MMSE
RECEIVER AT BOTH D AND E
In previous sections, we have assumed that E is not aware of
the FD operation of D and simply uses an MRC receiver h†se.
However, once E learns that there is additional interference, it
can adopt more advanced linear MMSE receiver:
re =
(HedQH
†
ed + I)
−1hse
‖(HedQH†ed + I)−1hse‖
, (40)
which, assuming that D also uses the optimal linear MMSE
receiver, leads to the secrecy rate
R
′
S = max
(
0, log
(
1 + Psh
†
sd
(
ρHQH† + I
)−1
hsd
)
− log (1 + Psh†se(ρHedQH†ed + I)−1hse)) .(41)
This results in the following secrecy rate maximization prob-
lem:
max
Q
F (Q) , log
(
1 + Psh
†
sd
(
ρHQH† + I
)−1
hsd
) (42)
− log (1 + Psh†se(ρHedQH†ed + I)−1hse)
s.t. Q  0, trace(Q) ≤ Pd.
For simplicity, we assume that perfect CSI is available. The
problem of (42) is in general not convex and the optimal design
of Q to maximize R′S is a cumbersome optimization problem,
so we propose to use the DC (difference of convex functions)
programming [33] to find a stationary point. First, we express
F (Q) as a difference of two concave functions f(Q) and
g(Q):
F (Q) = log det(I+ Pshsdh
†
sd + ρHQH
†)
− log det(I+ Pshseh†se + ρHedQH†ed)
− log det(I+ ρHQH†) + log det(I+ ρHedQH†ed)
, f(Q)− g(Q) (43)
where
f(Q) , log det(I+ Pshsdh
†
sd + ρHQH
†)
+ log det(I+ ρHedQH
†
ed), (44)
g(Q) , log det(I+ ρHQH†)
+ log det(I+ Pshseh
†
se + ρHedQH
†
ed). (45)
The linearization of g around the point Qk is
gL(Q;Qk) = log det(I+ ρHQkH
†) (46)
+ log det(I+ Pshseh
†
se + ρHedQkH
†
ed)
+Tr
(
ρH†(I+ ρHQkH
†)−1H(Q−Qk)
)
+Tr
(
ρH†ed(I+ Pshseh
†
se + ρHedQH
†
ed)
−1Hed(Q−Qk)
)
.
DC programming is used to sequentially solve the following
convex problem, k = 0, 1, · · ·
Qk+1 = argmax
Q
f(Q)− gL(Q;Qk) (47)
s.t. Q  0, Tr(Q) ≤ 1.
To conclude this section, problem (42) can be solved by i)
choosing an initial point Q0; and ii) for k = 0, 1, · · · , solving
(47) until the termination condition is met.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Computer simulations are conducted to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the proposed FD scheme. All channel entries are
i.i.d. drawn from the Gaussian distribution CN (0, 1). Unless
otherwise specified, it is assumed that E is equipped with
the same number of receive antennas as D, i.e., Me = Mr,
Mt = Mr = 2 and ρ = 0.5. The total transmit SNR, PT in
dB, is used as power metric.
We will compare the secrecy rate performance of the
proposed FD scheme with the baseline HD system, in which
the achievable secrecy capacity is expressed as:
CS,HD = max
(
0, log2(1 + Ps‖hsd,HD‖2)− log2(1 + Ps‖hse‖2)
)
,
(48)
9where hsd,HD denotes the channel between S and all antennas
at D in the HD mode. We maintain the same total power for
the HD and the FD systems.
For the optimization with fixed receiver, we consider the
following (non-optimized) MMSE receiver
r =
(
ρHH† + I
)−1
hsd
‖ (ρHH† + I)−1 hsd‖
(49)
which takes into account the self-interference channel as well
as noise power.
In Fig. 3, we evaluate the achievable secrecy rate against
total transmit SNR for the single-antenna case. We simulate
both cases with fixed equal power allocation between S and D,
and optimal power allocation. It is seen that both FD schemes
outperform the HD operation for transmit SNR greater than 10
dB, and substantial secrecy rate gain is achieved in the high
SNR region. The performance of the HD scheme saturates
when the transmit SNR is higher than 25 dB while ceiling
effects for both FD schemes start to appear when the transmit
SNR is 50 dB.
In Fig. 4, we show the same results as those in Fig. 3 for
the default multi-antenna setting. Firstly, it is observed that for
the HD mode, the secrecy rate saturates from very low SNR,
because E has the same number of antennas as D, while S has
a single antenna and there is no external helper. On the other
hand, for all FD schemes, the secrecy rate can keep increasing
as the transmit SNR increases without hitting a ceiling; this
is due to the fact that multiple transmit antennas at D help
suppress self-interference and generate jamming signal to E. It
can be also seen that the joint S−D power allocation only gives
marginal performance gain in this case. The optimal linear
receiver at D can improve the secrecy rate by approximately
10% compared to a fixed MMSE receiver. When an MMSE
receiver is used at E, the achievable secrecy rate starts to
outperform the FD case only when the SNR is greater than
10 dB, and the performance gain is reduced compared to the
case where E uses simple MRC receiver.
In Fig. 5, we examine the impact of residual self-
interference, ρ, when the total transmit SNR is 15 dB. The
HD mode does not suffer from self-interference, therefore the
secrecy rate remains constant. As expected, the secrecy rates
of all FD schemes decrease as ρ increases. All FD schemes
outperform the HD scheme, even when ρ is as high as 0.9. It
can also be seen that the performance gap between the optimal
linear receiver and the MMSE receiver becomes larger for
higher ρ. This is because the optimal linear receiver is much
more effective in compensating the higher self-interference.
When an MMSE receiver is used at E, much lower secrecy rate
is achieved as compared to the case in which E uses simple
MRC receiver, but the FD approach still outperforms the HD
one.
In Fig. 6, we provide the results of ergodic secrecy rate
against the total transmit SNR. The approximation of the
ergodic secrecy rate, which is used for power allocation, is
also shown for comparison. Similar to the perfect CSI case,
the ergodic secrecy rate of the HD scheme saturates from very
low SNR, while using the FD scheme, the ergodic secrecy rate
can increase without ceiling effect.
In Fig. 7, we plot the results of outage secrecy rate, where
the target outage probability is 10%. It is seen that for the HD
case, the achievable secrecy rate is very close to zero for all
SNR regions. Using the FD operation at D, the secrecy rate
can be increased with SNR, even with fixed power allocation
at S and D.
Finally in Fig. 8, we investigate the impact of different
combinations of transmit and receive antennas at D assuming
there are Mr + Mt = 4 antennas in total. E has Me = 4
receive antennas. We can see that (Mr = 2,Mt = 2)
provides the best performance, and this is because the joint
transmit and receive beamforming design can handle the self-
interference efficiently. Another interesting observation is that
the case of (Mr = 3,Mt = 1) greatly outperforms the
case of (Mr = 1,Mt = 3). This is due the fact that at
D, the receiver design takes care of both useful signal and
self-interference, while the transmitter design mainly aims
to suppress self-interference and effectively jam E. In this
sense, receiver design is more important than the transmitter
design, therefore more receive antennas can provide additional
performance gain.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a new self-protection
scheme against passive eavesdropping achieved by the FD
operation at the destination. This is of particular interest when
the secrecy performance of the system is interference-limited
and trusted external helpers are not available. To deal with
LI and maximize the achievable secrecy rate, we have studied
the optimal jamming covariance matrix at the destination and
possible power allocation between the source and the destina-
tion with both perfect CSI and CDI. We have shown that the
optimal jamming covariance matrix is rank-1 and can be found
via an efficient 1-D search. In addition, a low-complexity
ZF solution and the associated achievable secrecy rate have
been derived in closed-form. Using the proposed FD scheme,
the system is shown to be no longer interference-limited, in
contrast to the HD case. Substantial performance gains are
observed compared with the conventional HD operation at the
destination.
An interesting future direction is to study more sophisticated
scenarios, where the eavesdropper knows the FD strategy em-
ployed at the destination, and performs a similar FD operation;
this is likely to be studied within the framework of non-
cooperative game theory.
APPENDICES
A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: For simplicity, we define a , Ps|hsd|2, b ,
ρ|h|2, c , Ps|hse|2, and d , |hed|2. Then fρ(x) can be re-
expressed as
fρ(x) =
1 + a1+bx
1 + c1+dx
. (50)
Setting its first-order derivative of fρ(x) to be zero leads to
(cb − ad)x2 + 2(c− a)x− a
d
(1 + c) +
c
b
(1 + a) = 0. (51)
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We first consider a trivial case that cb − ad = 0. In this
case, positive secrecy rate is possible only when a > c.
Consequently, the first-order derivative is negative, which
indicates that p∗d(ρ) = 0 is the optimal solution. In the
following, we assume that cb− ad 6= 0.
We show that x1(ρ) and x2(ρ) cannot be both positive,
which requires
x1(ρ) + x2(ρ) =
a− c
cb− ad > 0, (52)
x1(ρ)x2(ρ) =
cd(1 + a)− ab(1 + c)
bd(cb− ad) > 0. (53)
We assume the first equality is true, i.e., x1(ρ) + x2(ρ) =
a−c
cb−ad > 0, in the following, we show that the second one
cannot be satisfied.
1) a ≥ c:
In this case, cb− ad > 0 and b > d. We have
cd(1+a)−ab(1+c) ≤ cb(1+a)−ab(1+c) = (c−a)b ≤ 0.
Thus, x1(ρ)x2(ρ) = cd(1+a)−ab(1+c)bd(cb−ad) ≤ 0.
2) a < c:
In this case, cb− ad < 0 and b < d. We have
cd(1+a)−ab(1+c) > cb(1+a)−ab(1+c) = (c−a)b > 0.
Thus, x1(ρ)x2(ρ) = cd(1+a)−ab(1+c)bd(cb−ad) < 0.
As a result, we know that x2(ρ) is the only possible positive
root of f ′ρ(x) = 0 if there exists one.
When ad
cb
= δ
ρ
> 1 or ρ ≤ δ, f ′ρ(pd) > 0 for 0 ≤ pd ≤
x2(ρ), so p
∗
d(ρ) = min(Pd, x2(ρ)); when ρ > δ, it can be
verified that f ′ρ(pd) < 0 for 0 ≤ pd ≤ x2(ρ) and f
′
ρ(pd) > 0
for pd > x2(ρ). So if x2(ρ) ≥ Pd, p∗d(ρ) = 0; otherwise
p∗d(ρ) = 0 or p
∗
d(ρ) = Pd. The proof is completed.
APPENDIX B
In this appendix, we derive the solution to the problem
below:
max
Q0
a†Qa (54)
s.t. trace(QR) = t, trace(Q) = 1,
where Q is an Mt×Mt matrix variable, R = H†hsdh†sdH−
tρPdH
†H is a Hermitian matrix which is not positive semidef-
inite and a = H†edhse is an Mt×1 vector. t is a positive scalar.
The dual problem is
min
λ1,λ2
λ1t+ λ2 (55)
s.t. λ2I+ λ1R− aa†  0.
It can be checked that λ2 > 0, otherwise, the secondary matrix
inequality cannot be satisfied. It is also known that there is at
least one rank-1 optimal solution q that satisfies Q = qq†.
Due to the complementary slackness, we know that
(λ2I+ λ1R− aa†)q = 0. (56)
We first consider a special case that λ2I+ λ1R is positive
semi-definite and its smallest eigenvalue is 0. Then we have
the following inequality:
0 = λmin(λ2I+ λ1R− aa†) (57)
= min
‖x‖=1
x†(λ2I+ λ1R− aa†)x (58)
= min
‖x‖=1
(x†(λ2I+ λ1R)x− x†aa†x) (59)
≤ min
‖x‖=1
(x†(λ2I+ λ1R)x+ λmax(−aa†)) (60)
= min
‖x‖=1
x†(λ2I+ λ1R)x (61)
= 0. (62)
Suppose one eigenvector that achieves min‖x‖=1 x†(λ2I+
λ1R)x is q1, i.e., q†1(λ2I + λ1R)q1 = 0, then the equality
sign is attained iff q†1a = 0, which is a trivial case.
In the following, we assume λ2I+ λ1R ≻ 0. It is easy to
verify that at the optimum, a†(λ1R+ λ2I)−1a = 1. Suppose
the eigenvalue decomposition of R is R = UDU†,UU† =
I,D = diag(d1, · · · , dMt), then q can be expressed as
q = U(λ¯1D+ λ¯2I)
−1b,b , U†a = [b1, · · · , bMt ]T , (63)
where λ¯1 = sλ1, λ¯2 = sλ2, s = 1b†(λ1D+λ2I)−1b . The
remaining task is to identify the optimal λ¯1 and λ¯2.
Substitute (63) into the two equality constraints in (54), then
we get the following two equations:{ ∑Mr
i=1 |bi|2 di(λ¯1di+λ¯2)2 = t∑Mt
i=1 |bi|2 1(λ¯1di+λ¯2)2 = 1,
(64)
from which we can solve all solutions (λ¯1, λ¯2) and choose the
one which satisfies λ¯2 > 0 and returns the maximum objective
value λ¯1t+ λ¯2.
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Fig. 1. System model with FD receiver.
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Fig. 2. The impacts of ρ on the optimal power allocation at D.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rate vs. total transmit power for the single-antenna case.
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Fig. 4. Secrecy rate vs. total transmit power for the multi-antenna case.
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Fig. 5. The effects of the LI channel strength ρ on the achievable secrecy
rate.
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only the CDI about E is available.
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Fig. 7. Outage secrecy rate for the slow fading channel when only the CDI
about E is available.
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Fig. 8. The impacts of ρ and antenna configurations at D on the achievable
secrecy rate.
